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Kubernetes Crash Loop Incident Report — Feb 25, 2026

Generated on: Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM · Prepared for: [Your Organization]

P1

Severity

18 min

Service Outage Duration

92%

Peak error rate

~8,000

Users impacted

Checkout abandonment

Revenue impact

Resolved

Service Status

ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM1/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
02/11

Executive Summary

On February 7, 2024, the checkout-api service entered a crash loop shortly after deploying v2.15.0. Pods repeatedly crashed with panic: nil pointer dereference in PaymentService.Process(). The incident lasted 18 minutes and affected approximately 8,000 users attempting checkout. Root cause was a missing nil check in the new payment flow code. Rollback to v2.14.3 restored service within 6 minutes of the decision.

ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM2/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
03/11

Timeline

  • 09:00:02 UTC — PagerDuty alert: INC-8842 Payment Service Degraded
  • 09:00:07 UTC — Redis cluster MOVED error. Auth-service falling back to DB (94% cache miss)
  • 09:00:10 UTC — War room: Stripe timeouts, Redis down, cascade incoming
  • 09:00:20 UTC — checkout-api connection refused. Pods exiting with code 2
  • 09:00:25 UTC — Alert: 92% error rate on /checkout (threshold 5%)
  • 09:00:35 UTC — Rollback initiated: checkout-api v2.15.0 → v2.14.3
  • 09:00:45 UTC — Redis failover complete. Auth cache recovering
  • 09:00:48 UTC — Root cause identified: nil check missing in PaymentService.Process()
  • 09:01:05 UTC — Checkout recovering. 6/10 pods on v2.14.3. Error rate 45% → 12%
  • 09:01:15 UTC — All pods healthy. Error rate < 1%. Incident resolved.
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM3/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
04/11

Root Cause Analysis

The primary root cause was a nil pointer dereference in PaymentService.Process() introduced in checkout-api v2.15.0. The new code path did not validate that the Stripe client was initialized before use when Redis session cache was unavailable. Under the cascade (Redis failover + Stripe latency), the code hit the unvalidated path and panicked.

A contributing factor was the Redis cluster failure, which increased auth-service load and caused 94% cache miss rate. This shifted load to the database and created additional latency that exposed the nil pointer path more frequently.

ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM4/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
05/11

Impact

  • Duration: 18 minutes (checkout unavailable)
  • Users affected: ~8,000 checkout attempts
  • Support tickets: 340 in 5 minutes
  • Revenue impact: Checkout abandonment during window
  • Root cause: Nil pointer in checkout-api v2.15.0 PaymentService.Process()
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM5/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
06/11

Action Items

PriorityActionOwnerDue DateStatus
[ ] P1Add nil pointer validation to all error paths in PaymentService@bob_dev2024-02-09In Progress
[ ] P1Add unit tests for Stripe API timeout scenarios in checkout-api@bob_dev2024-02-09Open
[ ] P1Implement mandatory canary deployment phase for checkout-api@alice_sre2024-02-14Open
[ ] P2Increase Redis cluster redundancy (6 → 9 nodes with 3 AZ spread)@charli_e_db2024-02-21Open
[ ] P2Add automated rollback trigger on panic rate threshold (>5%)@alice_sre2024-02-21Open
[ ] P3Add integration test suite for external API failure modes@bob_dev2024-02-28Open
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM6/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
07/11

Detection, Response & Resolution

Detection (09:00:00–09:00:02 UTC): The incident was detected within 2 seconds when the first checkout-api pod panicked. PagerDuty INC-8842 was auto-created via our Slack integration. Mean Time to Detect (MTTD): 2 seconds.

Response (09:00:02–09:00:35 UTC): On-call engineer @alice_sre acknowledged within 3 seconds. War room identified Stripe timeouts and Redis cluster failure as contributing factors. Decision to rollback was made 30 seconds after confirming the crash loop. Rollback initiated at 09:00:35.

Resolution (09:00:35–09:01:15 UTC): Rollback to v2.14.3 completed. Redis failover finished at 09:00:48. First successful checkout at 09:00:59. All pods healthy by 09:01:15. Mean Time to Resolve (MTTR): 59 seconds.

ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM7/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
08/11

5 Whys Analysis

  1. Why did checkout fail for users? → checkout-api pods were crashing in a loop, returning 502 errors.
  2. Why were pods crashing? → A nil pointer dereference panic in PaymentService.Process() caused immediate process termination.
  3. Why was there a nil pointer dereference? → Code in v2.15.0 accessed a pointer without validating it was initialized.
  4. Why was unvalidated code deployed to production? → The PR was approved without sufficient review, and no automated tests caught the nil case.
  5. Why didn't tests or review catch this?ROOT CAUSE: No mandatory nil-safety linting rules, insufficient test coverage for payment-critical paths, and no staged rollout (canary) to catch runtime errors before full deployment.
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM8/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
09/11

Prevention Checklist

  • Add nilaway or staticcheck linting to CI for nil-safety enforcement
  • Require 90%+ test coverage for payment-critical code paths
  • Mandatory canary deployment (5% traffic, 10-min bake) before full rollout
  • Automated rollback trigger when error rate exceeds 20% for 30 seconds
  • Circuit breaker tuning: fail-fast on upstream timeouts
  • Redis cluster: automatic failover, 3-AZ spread
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM9/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
10/11

Evidence & Log Samples

2024-02-07T09:00:00.123Z [FATAL] checkout-api-pod-7x9m2 panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
goroutine 42 [running]: github.com/shop/checkout.(*PaymentService).Process(...)
{"ts":1707318005,"level":"error","msg":"Stripe API timeout","service":"payment-gateway","duration_ms":30000,"error":"context deadline exceeded"}
Feb 07, 2024 09:00:07 UTC [ERROR] auth-service Redis cluster: MOVED 15389 - connection to node failed after 3 attempts. Falling back to DB, cache miss rate: 94%
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM10/11
ProdRescue AIIncident Report
11/11

Lessons Learned

  • Nil checks are critical in payment-critical paths. Defensive validation must be mandatory in code review.
  • Canary deployments would have caught this. A 10% canary would have limited blast radius.
  • Redis and Stripe failures can cascade. We need better isolation and circuit breakers between dependencies.
  • Kubernetes CrashLoopBackOff is a common symptom — this postmortem documents how we diagnosed and resolved a nil pointer in production.
ConfidentialPrepared by ProdRescue AI · prodrescueai.comGenerated Feb 25, 2026, 11:41 PM11/11

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